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Abstract
In the case of a 3G-WLAN interworking architecture, handoff latency is mainly caused by the delays incurred when
a mobile station (STA) transfers a current security context to the target access network or establishes connectivity
to a new access point (AP). Existing handoff optimization schemes have mostly focused on reducing the scanning
time which is to discover nearby access points. Even though the time taken by a mobile STA to authenticate the
target APs contributes to the total handoff delay, the schemes to optimize the authentication time have not yet
been fully investigated for providing seamless connectivity to mobile users performing handoff in WLANs. As a
solution, pre-authentication, a technique performing the authentication of target APs before the completion of the
handoff procedure, has attracted considerable attention to reduce the overall delay related with a handoff, which
is performed within inter-subnet and/or inter-administrative domain levels. Therefore, in this article, we propose a
novel pre-authentication scheme to minimize the handoff delay in 3G-WLAN interworking architecture. The
proposed scheme pre-authenticates a new AP directly through a switched channel in a short period of time. Our
evaluation shows that the proposed scheme outperforms the existing authentication schemes defined in the IEEE
802.11 standards in terms of authentication delay, signaling cost, and mobility rate. The proposed mechanism
offers an additional advantage in that it is easy to implement and deploy by simply modifying the device driver
modules of clients’ WLAN interfaces.
1 Introduction
Recently, the interworking between 3G cellular networks
and wireless local area networks (WLANs) has become
a global trend in wireless communications because of
the fact that these networks exhibit characteristics such
as wide coverage and high data rates that mutually com-
plement each other. According to the recent trends, sev-
eral schemes have been proposed in [1-3], these
schemes combine WLANs and cellular data networks to
form integrated wireless data networks. The 3rd genera-
tion partnership project (3GPP) has recently published
the specifications of a 3G-WLAN interworking architec-
ture [4] and their interworking architecture can be sim-
plified as shown in Figure 1. This architecture
introduces horizontal handoff (HH) and vertical Handoff
(VH) [5]. An HH occurs when a mobile station (STA)
roams within a network that uses the same radio tech-
nology, whereas a VH occurs when the mobile STA
moves between networks that uses different radio tech-
nologies. Handoffs (HOs) are further subdivided into
link-layer (L2) HOs and internet protocol (IP)-layer (L3)
HOs [5]. This article focuses on the authentication
operation during an L2 HH within WLANs with a 3G-
WLAN interworking architecture. In the 3GPP inter-
working architecture, it is mandatory to provide special
authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA) ser-
vers on a 3G home network (HN), generally including
the entities like WLAN access gateway (WAG), packet
data gateway (PDG), home subscriber server (HSS),
home location register (HCR), and HAAA as shown in
Figure 1, for interworking with WLAN’s AAA services.
Thus, given this requirement, if the 3G HN is located
far away from the mobile STA and if it is separated by
multiple networks and proxy AAA servers, a long
authentication and HO delay will be taken. However, it
should be noted that to achieve seamless mobility in a
3G-WLAN interworking architecture, the HO delay
must be as short as possible.
Generally, an HO delay is composed of an access
point (AP) scanning delay [6], authentication delay, and
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mobile IP registration delay in the case of an L3 HO [5].
AP scanning delay occurs in process when mobile STA
searches for and selects a new AP. Authentication delay
occurs in the process including establishing the identity of
the mobile STA and authorizing its access to the basic ser-
vice set of the AP. Mobile IP registration delay includes
two kinds of delays. First one occurs in the HA registra-
tion process. Second one occurs when mobile STA config-
ures a new network care of address in the foreign
network. One of the main factors responsible for the HO
delay has been reported to be the delay due to the authen-
tication process between the WLAN and the 3G HN
[5,7-9]. Existing HO optimization schemes primarily focus
on reducing the delay caused when a mobile STA scans
for nearby APs [10-14]. Even though the time taken by a
mobile STA to authenticate the target AP (TAP) contri-
butes to the total handoff delay, schemes to optimize the
authentication time have not yet been fully investigated to
mobile users performing handoff in WLANs. Therefore,
we mainly focus on reducing the authentication delay
using fast channel switching and a WLAN power saving
mode (PSM) buffering function when the STA performs
WLANs’ HH in 3G-WLAN interworking. The advantages
of the proposed scheme are summarized as follows: (a) the
proposed scheme ensures a reduction in the authentica-
tion delay when a mobile STA moves from one AP to
another; (b) it supports inter-extended service set (ESS)
and inter-domain HOs without the need for modifying the
currently deployed APs on the network side; (c) it prevents
loss of data because it takes into account the buffering
function of the APs; and (d) it overcomes the limitation of
the radio coverage of the currently associated AP (CAP),
which the existing authentication schemes suffer from
when the moving STA perform authentication with the
TAP.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we provide the background of this study and
describe previous related studies on pre-authentication in
WLANs, using various protocols such as IEEE 802.11f,
802.11i, and 802.11r. Section 3 provides details of the
proposed scheme, including the message flow and flow
chart. In Section 4, we compare the performance of the
proposed scheme with that of the conventional schemes
and present the numerical results. We also analyze issues
concerning the quality of service (QoS) and security.
Finally, Section 5 presents the conclusions of this study.
2 Background and related works
To introduce our scheme, we will first briefly describe
two basic operations, namely, channel switching opera-
tions and PSM operations. As in related studies, we will
analyze three standard authentication solutions and one
authentication solution that is under development.
2.1 Basic operations
2.1.1 Channel switching operations
A hotspot of WLAN is formed with at least one fixed
length radio channel guided by physical standard of
Figure 1 Simplified 3G-WLAN interworking architecture.
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IEEE 802.11. Figure 2 shows a scenario that a mobile
STA tries to switch its radio channel to a better one
within overlapped hotspots provided by a currently asso-
ciated AP (CAP) and a TAP. Messages 1b and 2b in the
scenario are to switch between two different channels
provided by CAP and TAP. The time of channel switch-
ing generally takes 1 ms to 5 ms [11]. To authenticate
with a TAP, a mobile STA must switch its channel to
the communication channel configured at the TAP.
When channel switching occurs, STAs suffer from two
potential problems as follows: (1) in-transit packets at
wireless links are missing which results the disruption in
seamless services and (2) the service quality of in-use
real-time applications at the STAs may degrade if chan-
nel is frequently switched. To prevent the first problem,
we introduce a solution using PSM operations where
details will be introduced in Section 2.1.2. Regarding the
second problem, because pre-authentication is per-
formed in a very short time with fast channel switching
(FCS), STAs do not suffer from service degradation
caused by the retransmission of lost frame and delayed
ACK messages [14,15]. We conclude and make the defi-
nition of FCS as follows. The current IEEE 802.11 stan-
dard supports multiple channels. Our proposed scheme
performed the pre-authentication with new channel by
fast channel switching in a very short time. FCS is the
method or operation for the mobile station to choose a
different channel to listen to without losing the current
channel session (data or packet).
2.1.2 Power saving mode operations (PSM)
In an infrastructure mode, an AP buffers every packet to
be sent to the sleeping STAs to avoid frame loss, and
notifies the buffer status through a traffic indication
map (TIM) field in the beacon frame, which utilizes a
shorthand method of listing association identifications
(AIDs). As shown in Figure 2, each time the mode of
the STA is changed, APs record the status of STAs
(power saving mode or awake mode) and perform the
function of buffering and forwarding. Power saving
mode (PM) is a lower-power mode in which the inter-
face cannot send or receive data. Awake mode (AM) is
a higher power mode in which the interface allows data
flow. It should be noted that a fake PSM message can
be created and sent by adjusting the IEEE 802.11 frames
(messages 1a and 2a shown in Figure 2). The fake PSM
message is defined as follows. As shown in this figure,
STAs only notify the AP to enter PM, however, the
actual mode of the STAs is the AM. After a listen
Figure 2 Concept of channel switching with PSM.
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interval (LI), the STAs in PM have to periodically listen
to and check for the beacon frame coming from the
APs. As soon as an STA notifies the presence of a buf-
fered frame for itself, it will send a power-save poll (PS-
Poll) frame to the AP to retrieve the buffered frame.
Otherwise, the STAs remain in the PM until the next
beacon frame is transmitted [16].
2.2 Related works
2.2.1 Standard pre-authentication: IEEE 802.11f/i/r
In IEEE 802.11f [17], an STA maintains association with
a single AP and transfers security context information
through the CAP to the TAP. This protocol is not
directly applicable for inter-domain HOs and only cov-
ers intra-ESS HOs [18]. Moreover, IEEE 802.11f was not
approved as a full-use standard protocol owing to its
unsuitability. As alternative enhancements, IEEE
802.11i/r were ratified to support secure roaming to the
TAP through pre-authentication with a key management
mechanism [19,20]. The IEEE 802.11i standard has been
included in the revised edition of the IEEE standard
802.11 since June, 2007 [21]. Pre-authentication of IEEE
802.11i/r enables an STA to establish a pairwise master
key security association (PMKSA) with a new AP
through the CAP. Once the STA successfully authenti-
cates the new AP, the STA completes pre-authentication
with a PMKSA between the STA and the TAP without
performing a four-way handshake. When the STA actu-
ally roams to the coverage area of the TAP, it sends a
re-association request message including the PMKSA
name to the TAP. If the TAP successfully sends an asso-
ciation response message, the STA and the TAP directly
perform a four-way handshake. In this manner, pre-
authentication enables the establishment of PMKSA
before an STA associates with a TAP (L2HO). At the
same time, the STA can mitigate the delay due to pre-
authentication with the TAP. Pre-authentication, how-
ever, has limitations, such as overloading on the centra-
lized authentication server (AAA server) with an
increase in the number of pre-authentication requests.
Moreover, as pre-authentication is performed at the
IEEE 802 layer (L2), it cannot be applied across IP sub-
nets (L3) or different administrative domains.
These intra-ESS technologies have three problems
when applied to current and future wireless networks.
First, the existing protocols especially designed for the
WLAN architecture are not applicable to inter-ESS and
inter-domain authentication over a 3G-WLAN architec-
ture. Mobile users have to perform HO to seamlessly
continue services regardless of the ESS or domains in
the context of the 3G-WLAN interworking architecture.
However, 3GPP does not specify details on WLAN HH
in 3G-WLAN interworking scenario. Thus, the EAP-
AKA protocol is invoked whenever an HH occurs. EAP-
AKA is an extensible authentication protocol (EAP)
mechanism for authentication and session key distribu-
tion using Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA)
mechanism. Second, for deployment, previous standard
protocols need to be modified on the AP or AAA ser-
vers on the network side. This means that the currently
installed equipments must be replaced, which is defi-
nitely cost ineffective for building commercial networks.
Third, when the STA moves at a high speed out of the
coverage area of the CAP, the transaction of pre-authen-
tication cannot be completed owing to the fact that the
STA loses connectivity with the APs. Hence, sufficient
time should be allocated for pre-authentication so that
the mobile STA can authenticate the APs.
2.2.2 IEEE 802.1X and EAP
IEEE 802.1X is a port-based network access control pro-
tocol that is used to establish mutual authentication and
works as an efficient key exchange mechanism between
STAs and authentication servers in wired and wireless
LANs [22]. This protocol uses EAP messages to handle
authentication requests and replies. EAP messages are
extensible as they can be used for different authentica-
tion methods with IEEE 802.1X, such as login user
names and passwords, smart cards, and digital certifi-
cates. The EAP procedure may include several round-
trip message exchanges between the STAs and the AAA
servers. Although the signaling overhead is determined
by the network topology, in most cases, these signaling
messages should be reached to the AAA server in the
home domain before the STAs can access network ser-
vices on a new network. Table 1 shows an experimental
results that the association and authentication/authori-
zation procedure in 3G-WLAN interworking scenario
brings a huge amount of delay approximately in 4.3 s.
The parameters listed in the above table are defined as
follows:
• a, b, and g: the scope of authentication being per-
formed in Figure 1 where denotes intra-ESS, intra-
AAA, and inter AAA, respectively
Table 1 Comparison of the delay of security protocols
(ms)
Scope a a b g
Protocol WEP WPA2-P WPA2-E 3G-WLAN
- 802.11i EAP-GTK EAP-AKA
Topen_auth 1.2 0.9 1.1 0.9
Tasso 2.1 1.2 3.8 2.3
TEAP - - 732.8 4313.5
T4WHS - 27.6 21.9 71.1
T4WHS + Tasso - 28.8 25.7 73.4
Tsum 3.3 29.7 759.6 4387.8
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• Topen auth: average time taken to authenticate
using the open authentication method
• Tasso: average time taken to associate with the APs
• TEAP: average time from EAPOL-start message to
EAP-success
• T4WHS: average time taken for a four-way hand-
shake between the STA and the APs
• Tsum: summation of time at each phase
The average delays for protocols WEP, WPA2-Perso-
nal, and WAP2-Enterprise (EAP-GTK: generic token
card) were measured at the Yonsei University and that
for protocol EAP-AKA was measured at SK Telecom-
munications, South Korea. The average delay for each
protocol was measured five times.
2.2.3 MPA: media independent pre-authentication
Dutta et al. [8] consider mobility management protocols
as well as provide schemes for optimizing the inter-
domain and inter-technology HO. MPA is a mobile-
assisted and secure HO optimization scheme that can
be applied to any link layer and is compatible with any
mobility management protocol. In MPA, pre-authentica-
tion is assumed to be performed by the protocol for car-
rying authentication for network access (PANA) [23].
Two keys derived from the authentication agent and
used to protect subsequent signaling messages are
securely delivered to the configuration agent and the
access router. Further, they assumed that the STA could
find a target network through IEEE 802.21’s media-inde-
pendent information service. MPA is useful in view of
the integration of L2 and L3 authentication. However,
to apply this scheme to existing network architectures, i.
e., the 3G-WLAN interworking architecture, it requires
significant modifications of the infrastructure or hard-
ware replacements which dramatically increase the cost
inefficiency.
3 Proposed pre-authentication scheme
The proposed pre-authentication scheme enables the
STA to authenticate a pre-determined AP once it has
decided to roam. This scheme can minimize the overall
HO time, thus effectively mitigates the service disrup-
tion of delay-sensitive applications.
3.1 Assumptions
First, we assumed certain conditions in the proposed pre-
authentication scheme. Most of the assumptions are based
on the interworking architecture shown in Figure 1.
i) An STA trusts the WLAN AAA (WAAA) and the
Home AAA (HAAA) with which the STA is
associated.
ii) Each WAAA must have a security association and
roaming agreements with the HAAA in the 3G
network.
iii) An STA can obtain information regarding the
TAP, including its current status information such
as a Beacon interval (BI), channel rate, and fre-
quency through active and passive scanning schemes
(e.g., proactive scanning [10], SyncScan [12]) or any
other 3rd party entity provided by IEEE 802.21 stan-
dard [8].
3.2 Channel switching period (CSP)
We introduce a conceptual time slot, namely, the CSP,
to allow an STA to interleave processes between data
packet exchange with a CAP and pre-authentication
with a TAP before triggering an HO. Specifically, the
activated CSP is a processing period for the authentica-
tion tasks in a view of a TAP and also a buffering period
for frames destined to the STA to the a view of a CAP
in parallel. The CSP can be allocated with the STA,
depending on the time required to complete the tasks.
We also define the tasks between the STAs and the
APs, such as association and authentication, as transac-
tions. The CSP begins when channel switching occurs
and ends when the STAs return their channel back to
the original one. To support successive transactions,
CSP operations, namely, channel switching and PSM
operations are repeated. The overall CSP allocation flow
is shown in Figure 3. Until the completion of the trans-
actions, the additional CSPs will be allocated to the
transactions in a loop. By checking the TIM field of the
beacon frame at every LI, the STA can acquire its
frames from the APs. When the STA receives the Suc-
cess or Fail frame from TAP, the STA will exit the CSP
loop. The LI informs the AP how often the STA wakes
up from PSM to receive buffered frames from the AP,
as well as allows the STAs to indicate how long the AP
must retain the buffered frames. On other word, higher
LI requires more AP memory size for per-STA frame
buffering. We will discuss the trade off between the LI
and AP’s buffer memory size in Section 4.5.1. To
describe the operation of the proposed scheme, first,
two new operations are defined. Before describing the
pre-authentication procedure in detail, we briefly intro-
duce CSP.begin and CSP.end operations.
The CSP.begin operation consists of
i) sending of a PS-Poll frame to the CAP with PM =
1 (buffering data),
ii) switching of the channel to the TAP, and
iii) sending of a PS-Poll frame to the TAP with PM = 0.
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while the CSP.end operation consists of
i) sending of a PS-Poll frame to the TAP with PM =
1,
ii) switching of the channel back to the CAP, and
iii) sending of a PS-Poll frame to the CAP with PM
= 0 (forwarding data).
3.3 Three phases of pre-authentication
We use the aforementioned CSP operations to reduce
the authentication delay. That is to say, the proposed
pre-authentication scheme allocates the CSPs using
channel switching to exchange messages and uses the
buffering function of the AP’s PSM to prevent frame
loss during pre-authentication. The basic pre-authenti-
cation procedures of the proposed scheme are depicted
in Figure 4. The overall pre-authentication operation
can be split into three distinct phases, namely pre-
authentication initiation, pre-authentication execution,
and completion and L2 HO.
3.3.1 Pre-authentication initiation phase
Initially, the STA communicates with the CAP on the
basis of the assumptions presented in Section 3.1. When
an STA enters an HO region, it ascertains its location
and mobility rate required for pre-authentication
(described in Section 4.3. When the STA decides to
begin pre-authentication, it requests and receives infor-
mation regarding the TAP (i.e., service set identifier
(SSID)) via the information server such as IEEE 802.21.
Figure 3 CSP allocation flow chart.
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3.3.2 Pre-authentication execution phase
After the pre-authentication initiation phase, the STA
initiates the pre-authentication execution phase by per-
forming the CSP.begin operation with the CAP and
TAP (operation 1 shown in Figure 4). In this phase, the
STA transmits pre-authentication request message
(same as the normal EAP request message) to the TAP,
and the TAP then relays this message to the AAA to
request for 802.1X/EAP authentication (operation 5).
This message contains the STA authentication
information that is required for standard 802.1X/EAP
authentication [24]. When the TAP receives an authen-
tication request message from the STA, it begins EAP-
AKA authentication on the basis of the messages
received. Finally, the STA performs the CSP.end opera-
tion to switch back to the original channel and main-
tains the current session with the CAP. The average
overall delay of the EAP-AKA authentication procedure
was approximately 4.3 s in the 3G-WLAN downward
HO (Table 1). Hence, until the authentication
Figure 4 Basic operation concept.
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transactions are completed, the additional CSP manages
the transactions, and subsequent messages are
exchanged to complete the pre-authentication phase.
3.3.3 Completion and L2 HO phase
After the pre-authentication execution phase is success-
fully completed according to the standard authentication
process, an EAP success message is transmitted to the
AP along with authentication keying material such as
pairwise master key (PMK). The AP buffers the received
EAP success information so as to send it to the corre-
sponding STA at the pre-defined LI during the next
CSP. The STA periodically checks the TIM field for
beacon frames coming from the TAP for receiving the
result of authentication during each CSP (operation 7 in
Figure 4). When the STA confirms that the TIM field in
the beacon frame is set at a certain CSP, it immediately
sends a PS-Poll frame to the TAP and receives all the
frames it is expected to receive. Otherwise, the STA per-
forms this operation (waiting and checking for beacon
frame) periodically. After a specified number of itera-
tions of the CSP, the STA can complete the transaction
(operation 5). Thereafter, the STA detaches from the
CAP while attaches to the TAP by using standard
WLAN re-association procedures. That is, L2 HO is car-
ried out from the CAP to the TAP. During this attach-
ment process, the WLAN confirms that the STA is the
pre-authenticated user from the previously received EAP
success message. Therefore, the STA is able to commu-
nicate with the TAP via the WLAN Access Network
(AN) immediately without any additional WLAN
authentication process.
3.4 EAP-AKA example
Figure 5 shows an example of the EAP-AKA processing
message flow in the proposed scheme when the CSP is
2 × LI, 200 ms. The EAP-AKA is the recommended
standard protocol in the 3G-WLAN interworking archi-
tecture. In the first CSP, the STA requests authentica-
tion via the WAAA to the HAAA. The AAA server
retrieves the STA’s information from the HSS and sends
the Authentication Vector (AV) to the TAP, including a
random challenge (RAND), the authentication token
(AUTN), the expected response (SRES), the encryption
key (CK) and the integrity key (IK). At this point, the
Figure 5 Proposed scheme procedure in EAP-AKA.
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STA is in the PM; thus, the TAP has to buffer the data
until the STA is in the AM. In the second CSP, the
STA is in the AM with respect to the TAP; thus, the
TAP now forwards the data.
4 Evaluation and analysis
This section evaluates the performance of the proposed
pre-authentication scheme, which is based on fast chan-
nel switching in 3G-WLAN HH. We have analyze EAP-
AKA in detail in terms of authentication delay, signaling
cost, and mobility rate. Initially, the STA is connected
to AP1 in domain A, as depicted in Figure 6. The STA
then performs three intra-ESS HHs to APs 2, 3, and 4
in domain A. Then, it performs an inter-domain HH to
AP5 in domain B, followed by two intra-ESS HHs to
APs 6,7, and 8 in domain B. The performance of the
proposed scheme is evaluated by comparing it with the
performances of the three standard 802.11 roaming
schemes [17,19,20]. It is difficult to accurately measure
the performance of the proposed scheme with respect to
HOs, because HO is affected by various factors such as
dynamic network topology and node location changes.
We thus present a numerical method to analyze the per-
formance of the schemes in an accurate and reasonable
manner within a realistic 3G-WLAN interworking archi-
tecture, as well as compare the proposed scheme with
the conventional schemes. In addition to the assump-
tions made in Section 3.1, we make the following
assumptions for evaluation purposes:
• The STA moves in a fixed path from domain A to
domain B, as shown in Figure 6.
• The user of the STA uses a real-time broadcasting
service from an Internet website, continuously.
When the APs are densely deployed, their network
providers are usually different from each other. In other
words, STAs are required to perform inter-ESS and
inter-domain HOs. The analysis parameters are listed in
Tables 2 and 3. Let Tw(l, hx-y) denotes the transmission
delay of a message with length l sent from x to y via
wired links. hx-y is the number of hops separating x and
y in the wired links. Tw(l, hx-y) can be expressed as fol-
lows:






+ (hx−y + 1) × Pt (1)
The transmission delay of a message with length l sent





The transmission delay of EAP messages via a wireless
link and a wired link, TEAP, is given by
TEAP = Tw1(EAPw1) + Tw(EAPw, dTAP - AAA) (3)
4.1 Total authentication delay
Authentication delay plays an important role in the total
HO delay. In this study, we assume that the AP scan-
ning delay and the L3 delay have the same effect on all
schemes. Authentication delay is calculated from the
time the EAP Request/Identity message is sent to the
time when a four-way handshake protocol is invoked, as
shown in Figure 5. The total authentication delay is
denoted by D. For an STA that performs HO, the total
authentication delay for each scheme is given by the fol-
lowing equations:








· Pb + 4 · (TEAP + TL2HO + T4WHS) × Nm (6)
Dp = 7 · (n × TCSP + Tw1(EAPw1) + TL2HO + T4WHS)× Nm (7)
Equation (4) shows the basic 802.11 open system
authentication (OSA) case without pre-authentication.
The IEEE 802.11 takes a hard handoff break-before-
make approach fundamentally, which means that an
STA has to break its connection with its CAP before
connecting to a TAP [25]. That is, the connection is dis-
rupted during every HO. Thus, the total authentication
delay in this case is the largest. Equation (5) shows the
case of the context transfer scheme such as the trial
standard IEEE 802.11f IAPP withdrawn on 2006. In this
protocol, break-before-make movements occur three
times in inter-ESS HOs, and make-before-break move-
ments occur four times in inter-subnet HOs. An STA
should transfer the security context to the TAP via the
CAP, beforehand. Equation (6) shows the standard
802.11i intra-ESS pre-authentication case referred to as
RSNA. In this case, break-before-make movements occur
three times in inter-ESS HOs, and make-before-break
movements that perform pre-authentication using
PMKSA via the CAP indirectly occur four times in
intra-ESS HOs. Equation (7) mathematically describes
the case of the proposed scheme, which performs pre-
authentication with the TAP directly beyond the border
of the ESS. In this case, only the CSP operation time is
needed, and not the EAP processing time.
The parameters used in this analysis are listed in
Table 4. Some of the parameter values are taken from
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articles [2,26]. In this study, however, we set the proces-
sing delay Pt to 400 ms because of the EAP-AKA pro-
cessing of generating authentication vectors and keys in
HSS and Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM).
The values of hx-y are shown in Figure 6. Moreover, the
total number of hops needed for EAP authentication
and an L2 HO is assumed to be 3 and 1, respectively.
Figure 7 shows a plot of the total authentication delay
against the STA resident time. As shown in this fugure,
the total authentication delay decreases with an increase
in the STA resident time. Further, authentication delay
is greater in the basic 802.11 OSA than in the case of
other pre-authentication schemes, because it has the
longest duration of disruption during an HO. Context
Figure 6 Evaluation network model and scenario.
Table 2 Parameters for Analysis 1
Parameter Description
NSTA_HAAA the number of EAP-AKA messages exchanged between an STA and HAAA
NSTA_WAAA the number of EAP-AKA messages exchanged between an STA and WAAA
Ninter-ESS the number of authentication messages exchanged for inter-ESS HO
Nintra-ESS the number of authentication messages exchanged for intra-ESS HO
Ncsp the number of CSP messages exchanged for inter-ESS HO
S the average authentication size
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transfer schemes such as 802.11f show similar perfor-
mances with 801.11 OSA because the transmission time
of the security context is overloaded between two APs.
The proposed scheme achieves the best performance
because its duration of disruption is shorter than that of
the other schemes. Therefore, the proposed scheme can
ensure a low authentication delay, because its pre-
authentication processes enable a fast HO.
4.2 Authentication signaling cost
The signaling cost introduced by an authentication pro-
cess is an important metric for evaluating its perfor-
mance. The authentication signaling cost is the
accumulative traffic load introduced in the network by
exchanging authentication signals during a communica-
tion session [2]. We compare our proposed scheme with
conventional schemes. The authentication signaling cost
associated with authentication during a session is
denoted by C. On the basis of the movement scenario
shown in Figure 6, C in the basic 802.11 OSA, 802.11f,
802.11i, and the proposed scheme can be calculated as
follows:
Cb = (8 · NSTA HAAA) × S × Nm (8)
Cf = Ci = (2 · NSTA−HAAA + 4 · Nintra - ESS + 2 · Ninter - ESS) × S × Nm (9)
Cp = (2 · NSTA HAAA + 7 · Ncsp + 6 · NSTA WAAA) × S × Nm (10)
Equation (8) implies that the basic 802.11 OSA is used.
The STA performs EAP-AKA authentication whenever it
starts communicating with an AP, irrespective of whether
an HH was performed or not. Equation (9) implies that
802.11f IAPP and 802.11i RSNA standard pre-authentica-
tion protocols are executed. These two standard schemes
usually exchange the pre-authentication messages between
the CAP and the TAP via the common Distribution Sys-
tem (DS) which connects APs in an ESS. Thus, we simply
assume that the signaling cost of the two schemes is the
same. These schemes perform full EAP-AKA authentica-
tion twice, context transfers (intra-ESS HH) four times,
and inter-ESS HH in an intra-domain twice. Equation (10)
refers to the case of our proposed scheme where pre-
authentication based on fast channel switching occurs
seven times with CSP operations. When the STA enters
domains A and B, full EAP-AKA authentication must be
performed twice for inter-domain HOs, and fast re-
authentication must be performed six times for the other
sections (pre-authentication within a domain without the
need for contacting the 3G HAAA). The value of S is set
to 100 bytes; Tr varies from 2 to 40 s. Figure 8 shows a
plot of the authentication signaling cost against the STA
resident time. It is generally observed that the longer the
STA resident time, the lower is the number of generated
authentication signals. Now, because our proposed scheme
uses the CSP operation to directly pre-authenticate the
TAP, the number of authentication signals generated by
our proposed scheme is greater than that generated by
conventional standard schemes. However, IEEE 802.11f
Table 3 Parameters for Analysis 2
Parameter Description
l Length of message
Tc Average session connection time
Tr Average WLAN cell resident time
Nm Average number of movements in session, i.e., Nm = ⌈Tc/
Tr⌉ - 1
LI LI
n Total number of CSP during HOs, i.e., n = ⌈TEAP/LI⌉
Bw Bandwidth of wired link
Bwl Bandwidth of wireless link
Lw Latency of wired link (propagation delay and L2 delay)
Lwl Latency of wireless link (propagation delay and L2 delay)
Pt Routing table lookup and processing delay
EAPw The total length of EAP-AKA messages exchanged in wired
link
EAPwl The total length of EAP-AKA messages exchanged in
wireless link
TCSP Average time need for CSP operations
TL2HO Average time need for L2 HO
T4WHS Average time need for 4-way handshake
sec_cxt Security context transferred from CAP to TAP
Table 4 Parameter setting
Parameter Value Parameter Value
Tc 1,000 s Lw 0.5 ms
Tr 2 ~ 40 s Lwl 2 ms
TL2HO 10 ms EAPw 150 bytes
T4HWS 30 ms EAPwl 145 bytes
TCSP 20 ms Sec_ctx 114 bytes
































Figure 7 Total lost packet vs. STA resident time.
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and 802.11i need to transfer context information between
APs. Moreover, as they cannot support inter-ESS and
inter-domain HHs, they require a greater number of EAP-
AKA authentication signals than our proposed scheme.
Therefore, our proposed scheme reduces the signaling
cost by an average of 32% of IEEE 802.11 OSA and
increases the signaling cost by an average of 8% in com-
parison to the IEEE 802.11f and 802.11i.
4.3 Mobility rate
In this section, we analyze the difference between direct
and indirect pre-authentication in terms of the mobility
rate (velocity). In scenarios where the STA moves at
high speeds, the STA performs HOs frequently; it
should be noted that the time between two HOs must
be sufficiently long to allow the completion of pre-
authentication. The duration between two successive
HOs/hl depends on the size of the wireless cell and the
speed of the moving STA. In the case of indirect pre-
authentication, the STA cannot go beyond the radio
coverage of CAPs to pre-authenticate the TAP. Contra-
rily, in the case of direct pre-authentication, the STA
can go beyond the coverage area of the CAPs to per-
form pre-authentication. Because the valid radio cover-
age for pre-authentication is extended to the coverage
area of TAPs, the STA could speed up higher than the
STA based on the indirect pre-authentication relatively.
The amount of time available for pre-authentication
depends on both the degree of overlap between the cov-
erage areas and the velocity of the STA. Here, we will
analyze the impact of the radio coverage, time for pre-
authentication, and the velocity of STAs.
In the example shown in Figure 9, let us consider an
STA moving with a velocity of v; this station transitions
between AP 1 and AP 2. The coverage overlap between
the two APs is assumed to be c, and the diameter of
each coverage area of two APs is d. Given these para-
meters, the time allocated for pre-authentication, T,
must be less than or equal to c/v if loss of connectivity

































Figure 8 Authentication signaling cost vs. STA resident time.
Figure 9 Mobility rate considerations in overlapped coverage.
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delay time s is approximately 1000 ms and the pre-
authentication delay time p is approximately 1000 ms.
The maximum velocity supported by the access network








where T is given by s + p and is 2000 ms. Equation
(11) shows that a mobile STA can perform indirect pre-
authentication at a speed of up to 90 km/h. It is
assumed that the STA initiates pre-authentication when
it enters the coverage overlap area, where it detects the








In contrast, as shown in Equation (12), the proposed
direct pre-authentication scheme extends c to be equal
to d of the coverage area of the TAP because of the fact
that the STA performs direct authentication with TAP
(usually, c ≤ d). This means that the proposed scheme
can support a mobility rate three times faster than sup-
ported by the direct conventional scheme. When the
STA moves from one coverage area to another, in the
case of the proposed scheme, the STA interacts directly
with the TAP. As shown in Figure 10, when T = 2000
ms and c is roughly 50 m, the maximum velocity at
which the STA can perform a successful HO is approxi-
mately 90 km/h, which is more than sufficient for daily
operation. With an increase in the overlapping coverage
area, i.e., with an increase in the number of TAPs, the
maximum velocity of the STAs can be increased further.
According to our experimental results, when T = 2000
ms and c = 90 m successful HOs can be made even at a
vmax of 162 km/h. If we consider a densely deployed
network topology, in which the AAA servers are very
closely located and many network nodes belong to the
same subnet, we can achieve HOs at very high STA
velocities.
4.4 Summary of performance analysis results
In this section, we summarize all the evaluation results
based on the WLANs HH scenario shown in Figure 6
and provide a single metric to allow clear understanding
of performance improvement.
As indicated in Table 5, the proposed CSP pre-
authentication scheme is 5 to 7.8 times superior to the
802.11 OSA, 802.11f, and 802.11i standard protocols,
respectively, when the mean delay time factor is consid-
ered. Additionally, the mean signaling cost of the pro-
posed pre-authentication scheme is 32% less than that
of 802.11 OSA and slightly more than that of the two
standard protocols.
Therefore, the proposed pre-authentication scheme
can minimize the authentication delay that occurs dur-
ing intra-and inter-ESS HOs in 3G-WLAN interworking
environments. It was also proved that the proposed pre-
authentication scheme is more efficient than the existing
authentication protocols in terms of the signaling cost.
4.5 Issues for consideration in the proposed pre-
authentication scheme
4.5.1 Relationship between the QoS and the CSP duration
The CSP is composed of a number of LIs. At each LI,
an STA has to wake up and check the beacon frame
coming from the APs when operating in the PSM. How-
ever, the STA actually wakes up when it receives the
CSP.begin message. This means that the CAPs have to
buffer the data for the STA until the CSP.end message
has been sent. CSPs have both the negative and the
positive effects on the QoS. The short intervals of CSP
consume much energy because of frequent channel
switching, which causes a degradation in the QoS. On
the other hand, the long interval of CSPs impose an
additional overhead on the TAP, resulting in excessive
buffering. However, it ensures that the response frames
derived from the authentication procedures are success-
fully delivered to the CAP. The mobility of STAs can
have a negative effect on the QoS, if they are not
authenticated on time, owing to long CSP durations. If
the STAs are not authenticated properly, the service
could be disrupted, which could result in the degrada-
tion of the QoS. We define the relationship between the


































Figure 10 Mobility rate considerations in overlapped coverage.
Table 5 Summary of performance analysis results
Comparison parameters 802.11 802.11f 802.11i Ours
Mean delay time (ms) 118 109 75 15
Mean signaling cost (Kbyte) 1001 634 634 684
Maximum speed of STA - - c/T d/T
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BI ≤ STACSP ≤ HOdistanceSTAspeed (13)
where STACSP is the CSP of the STA, and HOdistance
is the distance from the current point to the maximum
coverage point of the TAPs. The STAspeed is the velocity
of the STA. Equation (13) shows that STACSP is inver-
sely proportional to STAspeed and directly proportional
to HOdistance.
4.5.2 Security consideration
In this section, we cover specific threats introduced by
the proposed pre-authentication scheme. Since our pre-
authentication scheme involves the switching of chan-
nels between APs, we note the following security
threats. First, a resource consumption denial-of-service
attack is possible, where an attacker may send abnormal
pre-authentication request messages to the candidate
APs. As a result, the APs may spend computational and
bandwidth resources on processing the pre-authentica-
tion messages sent by the attacker. To mitigate this
attack, the candidate network or the authenticator (AP)
may apply packet filtering so that only pre-authentica-
tion messages received from a specific set of serving net-
works or authenticators are processed.
Second, some consideration of the channel binding
problem described in [27,28] is needed, as a lack of
channel binding may enable an AP to impersonate
another AP or communicate incorrect information via
out-of-band mechanisms (such as via AAA or lower-
layer protocols) [29]. Channel binding is a secure
mechanism for ensuring that a subset of the parameters
transmitted by the AP is agreed upon by the EAP peer
and the server. It should be noted that it is easier to
launch such an impersonation attack when using pre-
authentication than when using normal authentication,
as an attacker does not need to be on the same physical
link as the legitimate peer to send a pre-authentication
trigger to the peer. Meanwhile our proposed pre-
authentication scheme does not provide any key man-
agement and context transfer schemes among an STA,
APs, and AAA servers. The proposed scheme is carried
out in the link layer of STAs. It means L2 security pro-
tocol such as 802.11i RSNA can protect the CSP mes-
sages which used in our scheme. Therefore our
proposed scheme has an equivalent level of security to
the security method used in EAP.
5 Conclusions
We proposed a novel pre-authentication scheme based
on fast channel switching that performs direct pre-
authentication with the next AP, in advance. This
scheme minimized the authentication delay time dur-
ing HOs, as was clearly shown in Section 4. Moreover,
as shown in our evaluation and analysis, the signaling
cost has been considerably reduced. In addition, the
proposed scheme is efficient in inter-ESS and inter-
domain HOs. Further, it can be easily implemented in
WLANs by simply modifying the device driver of the
STAs. In other words, if there is any change in the
authentication and encryption methods, our pre-
authentication scheme will still work correctly because
it does not involve any modification and encryption
methods. Finally, our scheme takes into account the
effects caused by direct pre-authentication with TAP
and can efficiently support high mobility, which is a
property that has not been considered in existing stan-
dard protocols. Therefore, we can conclude that our
proposed scheme is a novel pre-authentication scheme
for IEEE 802.11 WLANs that support a 3G-WLAN
interworking architecture.
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